Historically, the economics of RIA custody rested on three main pillars: Ticket charges on trades, various revenue sharing payments from mutual fund companies (from sub-TA fees to data sharing agreements), and net interest income on cash (i.e., the difference between the amount of interest the custodian pays on cash in a client's account and the amount that they receive from lending those dollars out in margin loans), all of which generated revenue for the custodian and allowed them to provide their services and technology to RIAs for 'free' without an explicit platform fee.
Over time, though, the economic math began to shift as the preferences of advisors and their clients evolved. Brokerage and custodial platforms began to roll out lineups of 'No Transaction Fee' (NTF) mutual funds and later ETFs, where funds could be listed and bought free of ticket charges – except in order to still make money on the arrangement, the custodians charged ongoing revenue sharing (for mutual funds) and shelf-space (for ETF) fees, effectively shifting the revenue from the front end (ticket charges at purchase) to the back end of the transaction (revenue-sharing directly from the asset manager to the platform), which the fund companies then passed along to investors in the form of higher expense ratios (to cover what had shifted from a one-time to an ongoing recurring payment). Most fund companies went along with this shift, with the notable exceptions of Vanguard and Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA), which resisted back-end revenue payments in order to keep ongoing expense ratio costs lower (with the consequences that they continued to have higher ticket charges for transactions than other mutual funds and ETFs on most platforms). From the custodial perspective this worked fine, because they were still able to earn money either on the front end or the back end of the transaction, but clients (and often advisors) often found the bifurcated arrangement confusing and annoying, and often didn't realize that the lack of an upfront commission was usually more than offset by a (less transparently) higher expense ratio.
In 2019, however, in response to platforms like Robinhood offering zero-commission trading on most equities and ETFs (and Vanguard eliminating ETF transaction fees on its own brokerage platform, including from non-Vanguard ETF providers), Schwab and what became a wave of other custodians responded by cutting most of their ticket charges for purchase or sale transactions on those assets – which almost overnight removed what had been a major pillar of their business model. And that came at a time when the growth of ETF assets was starting to outpace that of mutual funds, which further eroded the mutual fund revenue sharing that custodians had relied on as well. Custodians found ways to make up for at least some of that revenue – most notably payment-for-order flow and securities lending programs – but as the financials of publicly traded custodians like Schwab have shown, their revenue streams from RIAs have steadily declined even as assets have increased, leaving them searching for new ways to make up the lost income.
The strategy that several large custodians have used to boost their flagging revenue has been to push for more revenue sharing on ETFs. Fidelity has been charging ETF sponsors a revenue share of around 15% total fund revenue since 2024 (and hitting funds that don't make the payments with a $100 'service fee' on transactions). Schwab announced in April that it was in negotiation with 400+ asset managers to impose revenue sharing on ETFs on their platform. And Merrill Lynch recently announced its own 10bps revenue sharing charge on active ETFs starting in 2027. But Vanguard, which has long resisted participating in revenue sharing in the name of keeping its expenses low, seems unlikely to go along with the new push for ETF revenue sharing, which on account of the sheer amount of assets managed by Vanguard could impose a heavy 'tax' on Vanguard and, ultimately, its investors: As a napkin-math estimate, , a 15% revenue share would amount to a $4,524 × 0.08% × 15% = $543 million per year paid out to broker-dealers and custodial platforms. Although the actual amount that would be less since Vanguard wouldn’t pay revenue sharing for ETFs sold though its own brokerage platform, the annual cost could still easily be on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars per year, adding up to billions over the long run.
All of which is important context for understanding the blockbuster announcement this month that Vanguard is acquiring the RIA custodian Altruist for a reported $4.6 billion.
At first glance, the transaction is surprising. Even though Vanguard was one of its earliest outside investors, Altruist made its initial mark as being exclusively an RIA custodian with no retail brokerage or asset manager affiliation, and therefore no incentive to compete with the RIAs on its own platform. Selling to Vanguard is a blow to what had been a pillar of Altruist's 'focused solely on advisors' brand, and some RIAs who moved to Altruist on the account of that may be upset to now have Vanguard and its retail brokerage behemoth (and thousands of CFP advisors through its Personal Advisor and Wealth Management arms) looming over their shoulders. And for its part, despite being around for over 50 years, Vanguard has long resisted getting into the custodial game (other than a brief attempt in the late 1990s and early 2000s that was eventually shut down and sold to TD Waterhouse). So why would Vanguard choose to get into the RIA custodial business now – and why would they acquire a custodian that has made its independence a core part of its value proposition?
For Vanguard's part, the long-term answer appears to lie in the battle over ETF revenue sharing, and more broadly on the way other brokerage and RIA custodial platforms are trying to generate revenue as intermediaries in the asset manager distribution ecosystem. When Vanguard eliminated all ETF trading fees on its brokerage platform back in 2018, it set the stage for other platforms to do the same by undercutting the fees that most of the other retail broker-dealers imposed. Acquiring an RIA custodian allows Vanguard to do the same thing for back-end revenue sharing payments: If other brokerage platforms or RIA custodians are going to require ETFs to pay 15% of their revenue back to the platform, Vanguard can undercut those arrangements by offering (both Vanguard and non-Vanguard) ETFs without such pay-for-play requirements via Altruist. Which in turn gives it more leverage to resist revenue sharing on other broker-dealer platforms… while incidentally also giving other asset managers more leverage as well, since they can always nudge advisors towards the Altruist platform as a lower-cost way to access their own asset management offerings. In other words, by paying $4B for Altruist today, Vanguard can potentially avoid a $100M+ annual revenue sharing ‘tax’ to other custodians – while almost as a side effect creating a new platform ecosystem that may keep costs lower for the entire asset management industry.
And so one of the big questions from here is how Vanguard's acquisition of Altruist impacts the custodian landscape as a whole. The move towards zero-commission trading led to a round of consolidation in the industry, most notably Schwab's acquisition of TD Ameritrade. If this acquisition undermines the possibility of ETF revenue sharing as a major source of income for custodians like Schwab and Fidelity, will more consolidation follow as custodians find themselves even more squeezed on revenue? Or will custodians be compelled to finally seriously consider charging an explicit custody fee to advisors to make up the lost revenue, rather than seeking ever more (less transparent) ways to generate revenue off of RIAs' clients?
There are other questions as well that will need to be answered as the acquisition unfolds. What will become of Hazel – the AI notetaker that Altruist bought and then turned into a full-fledged AI tax planning tool that momentarily shook the custodial market – if Vanguard decides it doesn't want to be in the business of selling SaaS technology (or will Altruist maintain it as a way to attract more advisors to Altruist's custodial platform as part of its technology value proposition)? How will Vanguard manage the conflicts between its own advice business – which Vanguard CEO Salim Ramji has vowed to expand in order to "democratize" advice – and the independent RIAs on Altruist's platform that don't want to compete with (or risk being undercut by) Altruist's new parent company for clients? And although Vanguard has stated its intention to keep Altruist as a separate operating business, will it eventually fold Altruist into the Vanguard brand as something like 'Vanguard Advisor Services', and/or redirect its software engineers away from 'just' building for advisors on Altruist and towards Vanguard's own recognized-to-be-outdated technology platform (effectively shifting the Altruist roadmap from Altruist advisors to Vanguard retail)? Time will tell… but for the time being, the Altruist acquisition is simply one more example of Vanguard's willingness to use its enormous size and scale to influence the costs and distribution economics of the financial industry as a whole.
This article first appeared on the Nerd’s Eye View at Kitces.com at https://kitc.es/advisortech-sep2026, and has been reprinted here with permission
Ben Henry-Moreland
Ben Henry-Moreland is a Senior Financial Planning Nerd at Kitces.com, where he specializes in writing and speaking on financial planning topics including tax, practice management, and technology. He also co-authors the monthly Kitces #AdvisorTech column. Drawing from his experience as a financial planner and a solo advisory firm owner, Ben is passionate about fulfilling the site’s mission of making financial advicers better and more successful.
Michael Kitces
Michael Kitces is Head of Planning Strategy at Focus Partners Wealth, which provides an evidence-based approach to private wealth management for near- and current retirees, and Focus Partners Advisor Solutions, a turnkey wealth management services provider supporting thousands of independent financial advisors through the scaling phase of growth.
In addition, he is a co-founder of the XY Planning Network, AdvicePay, fpPathfinder, and New Planner Recruiting, the former Practitioner Editor of the Journal of Financial Planning, the host of the Financial Advisor Success podcast, and the publisher of the popular financial planning industry blog Nerd’s Eye View through his website Kitces.com, dedicated to advancing knowledge in financial planning. In 2010, Michael was recognized with one of the FPA’s “Heart of Financial Planning” awards for his dedication and work in advancing the profession.
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