A storm is brewing in private credit – and it’s not what you think

Markets love familiar villains. In private credit, the usual suspects are non-accruals, covenant breaks, and credit losses. That’s the narrative financial reporters pounce on: it rhymes with the latest loan fraud or high-profile default and is fueled by Jamie Dimon’s “cockroach” quips.

Managers respond with facts and context to calm nerves, and we wait for the next news item and the same coverage.

I think the event most likely to trigger real investor stress is being missed.

The question for private credit managers is whether we’re ready for a different challenge. The next wobble won’t start with borrowers missing payments. It will begin with who funds the market now and how that capital behaves when news headlines turn.

Over the past decade, private credit was financed by insurance balance sheets, pensions, and sovereigns, long-term investors that model liquidity, accept mark-to-market noise, and don’t react prematurely to narratives. Historically, they invested in closed-end funds and separate accounts, where capital is locked, pacing is predetermined, and exits are managed and optimized by the Investment Manager.

Today, much of the capital flow for private credit comes in the form of open-ended private-wealth vehicles (interval funds, tender-offer funds, private BDCs), and the investor base and their advisors control liquidity. That feature isn’t a flaw; it’s an intended benefit, but it also involves costs and operational challenges that become more pronounced when the narrative shifts.

Let’s set aside the non-initiating indicators. Defaults are up at the margin but sit near long-run averages. Spreads are tighter, which is useful for pricing risk, but it’s not a fuse.  Leverage is an amplifier, not a trigger; the multiplier effect matters more if windows narrow, but leverage isn’t the trigger by itself, and the market is carrying less than a 1:1 ratio of debt to equity in these funds today.

The real risk is the collision of structural liquidity with behavioral finance. When sentiment turns, advisors rationally become more cautious. They slow down recommendations and allocations to avoid client objections. Over time, not only do new commitments slow, but a growing share of clients redeem. Allocations to private credit are reduced. Nothing dramatic, just prudent trimming. That’s enough to thin the bid.

From there, the plumbing takes over. Fund vehicles built to offer periodic exits must pre-fund them. Managers raise cash and equivalents, trim deployment, and keep financing lines warm to honor repurchase policies. Inevitably, net investment income falls, and distributions follow. Lower yields (which can also be exacerbated by market conditions such as declining base rates) make the funds less attractive to both new and existing investors, tipping the balance toward slower commitments and even higher redemptions.

When redemption requests exceed available capacity, mechanics do the rest. An interval fund with ~5% of NAV tender capacity facing 7–8% requests results in oversubscription: pro rata fills, queues, and frustration. Private BDC repurchases are typically board-discretionary and can be reduced or suspended, with similar frustration and slower new commitments. Balance sheets shrink when outflows beat inflows. The release valve is funding liquidity demands by drawing on maturing loans (1/3 of loans typically mature each year) or by secondary sales at a discount. Either way the private credit marks will be impacted. The reduction in capital towards credit or the time-constrained trades reset comps, drag NAVs, and feed the next headline. The loop is familiar: narrative → advisor caution → slower flows → higher redemptions → lower portfolio marks → caps/limited windows → negative coverage → deeper advisor caution.

As Robert Shiller reminds us, contagious narratives don’t just describe markets, they make them. Fund managers must actively contest today’s headlines with data, cadence updates, and plain-English liquidity guidance before the story hardens into self-fulfilling outflows. If your vehicle offers periodic liquidity, your risk isn’t the loan book; it’s the line at the door.

This isn’t new in private wealth, but it is new terrain for many private-credit managers. We saw a version of it with NAV REITs: macro shocks mattered, but the underappreciated driver was the wrappers’ plumbing combined with private wealth behavior. But these are bigger numbers. The net asset value of non-traded BDCs and interval funds, as tracked by R.A. Stanger, stands at $259 billion in net equity, with approximately half a trillion dollars in loans. This isn’t a pension fund’s locked-up commitment; it’s individual investors with access to liquidity. When they ask for it, you’d better be ready.

All the well-managed private credit funds from major fund sponsors have the capacity to meet liquidity calls, but the risk is that those calls will get out of hand if the narrative continues.

Call to action (managers)

• Brief advisors early and often; double your communication cadence. Are spreads tight because credits are strong? Defaults, recovery rates, and credit losses are part of every credit portfolio, and how you are performing. Are net flows positive or not, and what are the implications?
• Keep financing lines warm but avoid over-reliance by balancing the certainty of cash with future flexibility.
• Prepare for offense: opportunistic/rescue credit, secondary purchases at thoughtful discounts. Wider spreads with no change in credit quality is the time to have cash ready to deploy.

Note to clients & advisors

• Watch inflows vs. outflows. The spread between them precedes tighter redemption windows and balance-sheet pressure.
• Re-underwrite PIK trends, amendment frequency, and non-accruals (is PIK structural at origination or a reactive liquidity tool?). Is the portfolio sound?
• Be wary if the fund increases leverage to meet liquidity. This is a “tell” and should be of concern to you.
• Decide whether you can hold through a structural liquidity cycle that isn’t necessarily a fundamental asset-class problem.
• Every crisis mints a new vintage: secondaries at discounts with known performance are an opportunity. Opportunistic credit may emerge as the next allocation opportunity. Be ready to add.

For market observers, the questions remain: Are institutional managers who entered private wealth with semi-liquid wrappers ready to weather an unfamiliar storm? Will slowing capital availability impact loan marks? Are advisors looking in the right places for emerging stress?

We may be about to find out.

Mark Goldberg is the founder of Alternative Investments Market Intelligence (AltsMI.com). He has served as Chief Executive Officer of investment management and broker-dealer firms and received the Institute for Portfolio Alternatives’ Lifetime Achievement Award for his contributions to the wealth management industry. Through AltsMI.com, Mark publishes the Alts Leaders Survey and research on private-market adoption in the wealth channel. His commentary and published research are widely read, and he is a featured speaker at industry events.